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TENDER AND ITS EFFECT.
Chapter I.
An attempted performance of a contract or
obligation which is frustrated by the act of the
party to whom performance is due is called tender.
The word is applied to an offer of performance to do
something, and to an offer of performance to pay
something; and this distinction, growing out of the
nature of the performance, whether in chattels or
in money, must be kept clearly in mind. In the
first case, a tender of performance is a complete
discharge; thus, in a contract for the sale of goods,
if the vendor satisfies all the terms of the contract
as to delivery and there is a refusal to accept the
goods on the part of the purchaser, the vendor is
discharged from further performance. Such a tender
of chattels vests the title in the purchaser and
the vendor simply holds them as his bailee. In the
second case, where the contract consists in the pay-
ment of money, a tender by the debtor does not oper-
ate to discharge the debt, unless it be accepted by
the creditor.
A tender rests upon the supposition that the
defendant has been always ready and willing to per-
form the contract and that he did perform it so far
ashe was able, by making the requisite tender of per-
formance; complete performance being precluded by
nonacceptance by the other party. It claims, there-
for, that upon a suit being brought, the plaintiff
could have obtained what was due him without suit,
that suit is unnecessary and vexatious and, in con-
sequence, costs are given in favor of the defendant
and interest is not allowed on the debt subsequent
to the tender.
An actual tender unless rendered impossible
or impracticable by the fault or negligence of the
creditor, must be made in all cases where a debt is cue
or a contract executed and the party to whom it is pay
able is entitled to it without the performance of any-
thing on his part; the object of the tender being to
discharge the debtor from an action for it and to bar
a claim for interestsand costs by the creditor upon
the trial.
A tender of a debt may be made only in those
cases where the demand is of a pecuniary nature and
liquidated or capable of liquidation and in no in-
stance where the claim is unliquidateu. This is the
common law rule and is based upon the principle that
where one has suffered for a wrong he should not be
put to expense just because his adversary can make a
better guess of the amount the jury may award.
Green v. Bell, 19 Vt. 592.
It is now provided by statute in most of the
states that a tender may be made in cases of trespass
which are casual or involuntary. The defendant is
allowed to tender such an amount as he deems a suf-
ficient satisfaction for the injury done and it will
be applied in payment of the damages to the plaintiff.
It may even be made by the defendant after the com-
mencement of the action. In order to avail himself
of this remedy, the defendant must show unmistakeably
that the trespass was casual or involuntary.
Slack v. Brown, 13 Wend. 390.
In order that any benefit may be derived by
the making of a tender, the law should be strictly
followed because a tender is stricti juris and noth-
ing is presumed in its favor; even a court of equity
will not supply a defect in a tender. In general,
the law requires that the tender be definite and
certain in its character and that it be made in good
faith.
A mere proposition to pay is not, in itself,
a valid tender neither is mere readiness or willing-
ness to pay. There must -be an actual production of
the money or something to excuse the failure to pro-
duce it. In Iowa, it is allowed by statute to make
a valid tender by a mere offer in writing. It has
been held that an offer to go up stairs and get the
money is good; but it has been held not good where
there was an offer to procure the money in five min-
utes. It is also held to be insufficient to re-
tain it in an envelope although the debtor shows the
envelope to the creditor and shakes it at him. In
Sands v. Lyon, 18 Conn. 18, A owed B some money and
was proceeding in a wagon to the latters residence
5when he met B on foot. A stopped his wagon and said
to B, ''I have got the money here to pay you,'' spec-
ified his claim and put his hand in his pocket to
take out the bag which contained the money. While
he was doing this B said; ''I want nothing to do
with such cut-throats as you," and walked rapidly
away from A. The court held that A was thereoy pre-,
from producing the money and offering it to B and
that it, was a good and sufficient tender.
Strong v. Blake, 46 Barb. 227.
Casady v. Bosler, II Iowa 242.
Sands v. Lyon, I8 Conn. 18.
Knight v. Abbott, 30 Vt. 577.
In all cases, in order that the offer may
be good, the debtor should have the present right to
pass the title immediately upon acceptance. As a
general rule, the money should be actually produced
unless the circumstances of the refusal amount to a
waiver. But a bare refusal to receive the money
proposed is not sufficient to dispense with an act-
ual production; nor will that which might be termed a
hesitating refusal, based upon a claim for more than
is due, dispense with the production of it. Those
cases which conclude that it is necessary that the
money be in sight, are based upon the prirciple that
owing to the weakness of human nature, the sight of
the money may induce the creditor to accept what he
otherwise would not.
In the case of executory contracts, a tender
is sometimes useless and of no avail because of some
act of the other party, and in these cases a tender
is not required, for the law does not compel any one
to do a thing which is vain and fruitless. Lex nem-
inem coget ad vena seu inutilia. These cases occur
where the creditor has sold the goods to another
party or where he expressly declares the contract to
be at an end and refuses to perform. Tender in
these cases would be a mere idle ceremony and useless.
Parker v. Pettit, 43 N. J. Law, 512.
Chapter II.
At common law, a tender must be made upon
the day on which the debt became due, provided the
contract fixed a day for performance, because a plea
of tender was only available to those who were guilty
of no breach of contract. If no day is fixed, then
the party should make a tender which, in respect to
time, would under all the circumstances be reasonable.
A tender before the due day is held to be bad in many
cases but where payment is to be made at or before a
certain day, it is quite generally held that payment
before the day is payment on the day, especially if
the debt does not draw interest. The rule that a
distant day is given entirely for the advantage of
the debtor is founded on reason, as no man is sup-
posed to be injured by a payment before the time but
a debtor may be greatly injured if he has not this
right of payment or tender of payment.
Dobie v. Larkin, 10 Exch. 776.
M'Hard v. Whitecroft, 3 P.& M'H. 85.
In most of our states, a tender is now allowed
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to be made even after the due day in many cases.
The greatest difficulty we find to be in respect, to
the time of day. It is stated as a general rule
that performance or tender of performance should be
made the last convenient hour before sunset. In
Croninger v. Cr-cker, 62 N. Y. 158, it is laid down
as a rule, !That a tender of bulky articles in the
performance of an agreement must be seasonably made,
so that the person to whom they are tendered may have
an opportunity to examine the articles and see that
they are such as they purport to be and such Ps he is
entitled to demand, before the close of the day on
which delivery is to be made. Whether the tender
should be made before sunset may depend upon circum-
stances and does not appear to have been decided by
the courts of this state. But when daylight is re-
quired for the proper examination and assortment of
the goods tendered, there can be but little doubt
that time should be given the tenderee for such ex-
amination before sunset and by daylight.'
Croninger v. Crocker, 62 n. Y. 158.
In Hall v. Whittier, 10 R. I. 530, 534, the
rule is laid down that the last convenient hour of
the day is the time for performance so that it may
be completed by daylight, for they say that the rule
is established for the convenience of the parties,
that neither may be compelled unnecessarily to attend
during the whole day. Earlier in the day, therefor,
neither party can discharge himself in the absence of
the other by being present and ready to perform.
As to a tender of money, an examination can
be made after sunset and it is generally held that
it is good if made at any time during the day and be-
fore midnight; if, under the circumstances, it is
reasonable and works no injustice. In the case of
bills of exchange and promissory notes, the rule
that payment must be made during banking hours of the
last day is the general rule, otherwise during the
regular business hours of the place as fixed by cus-
tom and usage.
A common law contract falling due on Sunday
or a legal holiday, a tender on the following day is
good.There is some conflict as to whether payment
should be made before or after the last day of grace
where such day falls on Sunday or a legal holiday.
The general rule is that a tender of payment should
be nade on the day before, for the reason that grace
is a mere favor extended for the benefit of the
debtor. New York, on the contrary, holds that a
tender on the day after the last day of grace will
be good.
Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205.
Farnum v. Fowle, 12 Mass. 89.
Where the contract or agreement specifies a
place for performance, a tender should be made at that
place; but where no place is specified, the debtor
must seek his creditor wherever he may be found,
though he is not bound to follow him out of the state.
But the creditors intentional absence from home for
the purpose of avoiding a tender gives the debtor a
right to make a tender at his residence or excuses
it altogether. In Smith v. Smith, 25 Wend. 405, the
learned judge enters upon a criticism of an old rule.
He says; "The general rule, as laid down by Litt.
sec. 304, ( 2 Coke Litt. 55.), is,if no place for
performance or payment be specified, the party is
bound to seek the person to whom it is due, if with-
in the realm: and the learned commentator after ap-
proving of the doctrine adds that if out of the realm,
this dispenses with the tender and no rights are
lost by the inability to make it. The true meaning
of the text and commentary I apprehend applies to the
case where the party to whom the money is to be
paid has no residence in the kingdom. If he has a
residence, it would seem to be agreeable to the un-
derstanding of the parties to the contract, that the
tender should be made there; as it is but reasonable
to presume some competent person has been left to
transact the business. It would be most inconven-
ient and often impracticable rule, besides liable to
great abuse by the party to whom the money is due, to
exact, in all cases where no place is mentioned, a
tender personally.'
Hale v. Patton, 60 N. Y. 233.
Smith v. Smith, 25 Wend. 405.
A tender of rent is good whether made to the
creditor personally or upon the land, because rent
issuing out of land savors so far of the realty
that it is payable on the leased premises. But a
covenant for payment, where no particular place is
specified in the deed, is not performed unless the
tenant seeks his landlord wheresoever he may be, if
he be infra quatuor maria.
Walter v. Dewey, 16 Johns. 222.
Haldane v. Johnson, 8 Exch. 689.
Chattels should be delivered at the creditor's
place of business or at any place sanctioned by cus-
tom and usage. The general rule is that the vendor
is not bound to deliver the goods but if he agrees to
deliver then he should deliver them at the vendee')s
place of business. In Miles v. Roberts, 34 N. H.
254, it is said that; 'The contract is to be consid-
ered with all its attendant circumstances and the
place of delivery is to be inferred from the nature
of the contract and the articles to be delivered;
from the situation of the parties, and from any
other circumstances from which the court may reason-
ably infer the intention of the parties. Whatever
may be thus reasonably inferred is regarded as if it
was expressed in the contract itself.' Where no
place is designated and the articles are very bulky,
it is sometimes necessary to seek the creditor and
ask him to desinnate a place for delivery and then of-
fer them at such place if it is reasonable. Of
course the intention of the parties will always con-
trol.
Goodwin v. Holbrook, 4 Wend. 377.
Miles v. Roberts, 34 N. H. 254.
Vance v. Bloomer, 20 Wend. 196.
Chapter III.
When a tender is made by the debtor himself,
no question can arise as to whether it was made by
the proper party. So also there is no doubt but
that an agent may make a valid tender for his prin-
cipal. Want of authority in an agent cannot be
taken advantage of unless such objection be made at
the time of the tender, and a ratification of an
act done without authority is equivalent to a
previous authority. If there are several debtors
a tender by all or any one of them on behalf of all
is sufficient; and the rule is the same whether the
debtors are jointly liable or jointly ar severally
liable. The reason being that there is an implied
agency existing between them.
Lampley v. Weed, 27 Ala. 621.
A tender, in order to be good, must be, in
general, made by the debtor, his authorized agent,
or his legal representatives and not by a stranger;
though a stranger's acts may be subsequently rati-
fied and then of course it is the same as if made
under previous authority. But necessity and expe-
diency may change the rule so that it may sometimes
be given by one who is an entire stranger to the
transaction. For this reason any one may make a
tender for an idiot. So a tender on behalf of an
infant by one sustaining near relationship, though
not a guardian, is generally held good.
Eslow v. Mitchell, 26 Mich. 500.
I.Co. Litt. 206b.
I Rawle 408.
In general, any one who has an interest in
the consequences of a tender may make an effectual
tender. An inhabitant of a school district may make
a valid tender on behalf of such district without ex-
press authority, for he has an interest in the conse-
quences of the tender, to wit: he stands liable to
have his property seized and sold on execution to
pay such claim. Any one who has an interest in the
mortgaged premises, claiming under the mortgage has
the right to redeem and the right to redeem carries
with it the power to make a tender of payment so
that it will discharge the mortgage. The only requis-
ite is a privity of estate with the mortgagor.
Kincaid v. School Dist., II Me. 188.
Casserly v. Witherbee, 119 N. Y. 522.
The creditor or his lawfully authorized agent is the
proper person to whom a tender should be made; but
such agent must have the authority to receive it or
else be placed in such a position that he is impliedly
authorized to receive it. So there is an implied
agency existing between partners and other joint cred-
itors to receive a tender on be-half of all. It
will be sufficient to make a tender to a person whom
the creditor permits to occupy his place of business
apparently in the character of clerk or agent. One
ostensibly carrying on a business in the absence of
his principle surely has implied authority to receive
payment made in the ordinary course of business, and
this, even though the goods had been previously pur-
chased, and even though the clerk had previously
been forbidden to receive the money if tendered.
Wycoff v. Anthony, 90 N. Y. 442.
Moffat v. Parsons, 5 Taunton 307.
An attorney who has a claim for collection
is not authorized to receive a tender before he
brings suit but if he actually has the note or bond
in his posession, a tender to him is valid. A re-
quest by an attorney to pay at his office gives a
debtor the right to treat any one in charge thereof
as authorized to receive payment, even though it be
the clerk of the attorney. A tender to an attorney
of the creditor even though he deny his authority is
valid.
Thurston v. Blaisdell, 8 N. H. 367.
Jackson v. Crafts, 18 Johns. 110.
Kinton v. Braithwaite, I M. & W. 313.
M'Iniffe v. Wheelock, I Gray 600.
The one to whom the tender is offered must
be present and have an opportunity to object to or
accept it. A woman engaged in the ordinary affairs
of life is not bound to know at all times what is
owing her upon a mortgage and to be ready to deter-
mine, forthwith, without opportunity for examination
and computation, whether she will accept ant partic,"
ular sum offered her. She must have a reasonable
opportunity to satisfy herself what her rights are.
Ventres v. Cobb, 105 Ill. 33.
Root v. Bradley, 49 Mich. 27.
Chapter IV.
At common law, a tender was required to be
made in the current coin of the realm or in foreign
money legally made current by proclamation. By the;
United States Constitution, Art.I, Sec. 10, it Is pro-
videdthat no state shall make anything but gold and
silver coin a tender in payment of debts. This
provision is not a prohibition on the United States
Government; so by this omission to declare what
shall or shall not be a legal tender in the Union,
power is,by necessary implication, conferred upon
Congress to designate what shall be a legal tender.
It will not be necessary to enter into a
full discussion of the history of legal tender in
this country as it has been ably treated in numerous
instances. The present status of legal tender money
seems to be, that all gold coin is a legal tender
at its nominal value in payment of all debts both
public and private. Silver dollars are also legal
tender in all payments at their nominal or face val-
ue; but subsidiary silver coin, only to the amount
of ten dollars in any one payment. The minor coins,
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such as the nickle five cent piece, the three and
one cent pieces are legal tender for any sum not ex-
ceeding twenty five cents. Foreign coin is not a
legal tender.
U. S. Revised Statutes, Sec. 3584-3587.
By the Act of March 3, 1863, Congress pro-
vided for an issue of paper money, commonly called
'greenbacks',and made them a legal tender in payment
of all debts both public and private. The power of
Congress to make such money a legal tender was as-
sailed and held to be unconstitutional but this was
reversed by the 'legal tender cases', in which it was
held to be within the power of Congress, as given
by the Constitutoon, to make paper money a tender
in payment of all obligations, and this, even though
the debt was contracted before the passage of the
Act. Py the Act of July 14, 1890, providing for
the purchase of silver bullion and the issue of
certificates thereon in payment, such certificates
were made a legal tender in payment of all debts.
'Legal Tender Cases,' 12 Wall. 457.
U. S. Revised Statutes Sup. Vol. Ip. 563
& 774.
It must be remembered that the creditor may
waive a strict legal tender and accept any other
coins or notes and it will constitute a valid tender.
This doctrine of waiver does not apply to depreciat-
ed or uncurrent money, for a tender of depreciated
money would be, in effect, a compromise. It applies
only to such bills as are redeemable at the bank
where issued on presentation and pass at par in the
business transactions of the place at which they are
offered. Bank notes now circulate as freely as the
national currency and are considered just as good;
and any objection made as to their not being a leg-
al tender is deemed to be an objection of form and
is considered as waived if not made the subject of
a special objection.
Ontario Bank v. Lightbody, 13 Wend. 1OT.
An obligation payable in a particular kind
of money must be paid in that particular money because
it is a term of the contract. A note payable in
coin can not be discharged by a tender or payment of
treasury notes. A tehder in Confederate money is
not good although it is, at the time, the circulating
medium of the community.
M'Goon v. Shirk, 54 Ill. 408.
'Legal Tender Cases,' 12 Wall. 457.
Graves v. Hardesty, 19 La. Ann. 186.
There can never be a valid and legal tender
of the pronmissory note of an individual, unless
there is an agreement to accept it in the ordinary
course of business. As to checks, the same rule
applies though somewhat more looselyand they are
held to be a good tender if not objected to, espec-
ially, where there are funds in the bank to secure
it or where it has been certified. But a creditor's
mere silence has been held not to amount to a waiver
of a strict legal tender.
Mitchell v. V. C. M. Co., 67 N. Y. 280.
A tender is only validly made when the debt-
or produces and offers to the creditor a sum of money
equal to the amount of the debt plus all interest and
costs that may have accrued. The general rule is
that the exact sum must be tendered, for the tender
of a less sum is valueless even though the debtor may
honestly believe that the amount tendered is all
that is due.
Dixon v. Clark, 5 C.& B., 365.
A tender of the full amount of costs that
may have accrued is not necessary in all cases, for
they can not always be determined in a moment; for
this reason, an offer to pay the costs when determined
will be deemed sufficient. The tender of an amount
as the sum justly due by the conditions of a bond is
good although less than the penalty, for the penalty
is only mominally the debt and a tender of an amount
which if paid would fully satisfy the bond is as ef-
fectual as a tender of the full amount of the penalty
In regard to the discrepancy in the amount of the
tender and the sum due being a trifle, Chief Justice
Parsons, in Boydon v. Moore, 5 Mass. 365, said; 'In
making payment, it is sometimes not possible, from
the value and divisions of current coin, to make the
exact sum ; if payment be made as nearly as it can
conveniently be made, the fractional part of a small
coin may be neglected, it is a mere trifle!' It is
only another application of the old maxim, 'de mini-
mus non curat lex.'
Spencer v. Perry, 18 Mich. 394.
It is well settled that a larger amount can
not be tendered when restricted by a demand for
change; but the tender of a larger amount without
such a demand is good for,'omne majus continet in se
minus.' The rule that no change can be required
is based upon the idea that if it could be demanded,
therewould be opened a gateway to great inconven-
ience, for it is not just nor equitable that a person
should be allowed to tender a thousand dollar bill
upon a debt of one dollar and demand change of the
difference.
Revans v. Rees, 5 M.& W. 306.
Betterbee v. Davis, 3 Camp. 70.
Chapter V.
One of the well settled doctrines of tender
is that it must be unconditional. The rule is well
stated in I Sutherland on Damages p. 462. 'No cond-
ition can be annexed which, by acceptance, would pre-
clude any question which would otherwise be open to
the creditor. He should be at liberty to accept
the tender and to say he does not take it in full
satisfaction of his demand and that he does not for-
go any right by its acceptance, except to deny that
so much was paid and such benefits to the tenderer
as are consequent by legal intendment. The party
making the tender should be content to allow the cred-
itor to take the money and get more if the jury find
him entitled to it; or to assert any other right
which consists with the mere acceptance of the money
and applying it to the subject.'
The acceptance of a conditional tender is an
acceptance of the condition and it then becomes a
matter of contract between the parties and enforce-
able as such. In all cfnses, the debtor or tenderer
has a right to prescribe the terms of a tender and
the creditor may accept or refuse; if he accepts, he
must do so upon the terms prescribed by the debtor;
if he refuse it, in order that it may still be a val-
id tender, it must have been made without conditions,
at least, with no conditions to which the creditor
could have made a reasonable objection; that is, with-
out any condition prejudicial to the creditor.
Bickle v. Beseke, 23 Ind. 18.
Wheelock v. Tanner, 39 N. Y. 481.
A conditional tender is valid when the credit-
or is bound by law to perform the conditions or
where they are terms in the contract. A mortgagor
may restrict the tender of a mortgage debt by a con-
dition that thexmortgagee execute a satisfaction
thereof. New York state has carried this liberal-
ity much farther than any other state and holds that
a receipt or satisfaction can be demanded in most
cases and the condition will not invalidate the
tender.
Halpin v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165.
There is much conflict of authority on the
point as to whether a receipt can be demanded as a
valid condition of a tender. It is quite generally
held that the demand of a receipt in full is not a
valid condition. The reason such a tender has so
often been held void seems to have been not merely
because a receipt was asked for but rather because
a part was offered in full payment. Some courts
hold that a tender of a sum and a demand of a re-
ceipt for the sum tendered will not invalidate the
tender.
Story v. Krewson, 55 Ind. 397.
Loring v. Cooke, 3 Pick. 48.
Brock v. Jones, 16 Texas 461,467.
In the case of non-commercial prommissory
notes, the authorities are in conflict as to whether
a good tender can be made upon the condition that
the note be surrendered; but in the case of commer-
cial paper, the authorities seem to be uniform in
holding that a tender upon the condition that the
paper be surrendered is good because such note might
be put in circulation after payment and innocent
parties become liable; not so, however, with non-co-m-
mercial paper, after payment by the maker it becomes
harmless as against him wherever it may go. The
question as to whether a tender was made upon a con-
dition or not is for the jury.
Story v. Krewson, 55 Ind. 397.
Dooley v. Smith, 13 Wall. 604.
Eckstein v. Reynolds, 7 Ad. E. 80.
In order to derive any benefit from a tender,
it should be kept good, that is , the money must at
all times be kept in readiness for the creditor and
not be used by the debtor; for if he fails to keep
it good, upon being subsequently informed that it
will be accepted, he thereby places himself in de-
fault and looses all the benefit of his tender. It
was held in Curtiss v. Greenbanks,that the debtor may
use the money as his own, for all that he is required
to do is to be prepared at all times to pay upon a
reasonable demand the amount of the tender in current
money; the identical money tendered is not required
to be kept good for one dollar in law is equivalent
to every other dollar. But the keeping of the iden-
tical money good and in readiness is valid even
though it has depreciated subsequent to the tender.
The deposit of the money with a third person will
not be sufficient, even though notice be given to the
creditor because he is not bound to call upon the
third party; he may call upon the debtor and if he
be not ready to pay, the benefit of the tender is lost.
Green v. Fry, 93 N. Y. 353.
Curtiss v. Greenbamz's, 24 Vt. 536.
Mich. Cent. R. R. v. Dunham,30 Mich 128.
I Hayw. 183.
Town v. Trow, 24 Pick. 168.
In order that a tender may be made the basis
of affirmative relief upon action being brought, it
should be kept good by bringing it into court and
alleging that fact in your answer. The money should
be paid into court a- any time, provided it is suf-
ficient to cover accrued interest and costs, in or-
der to stop those which may subsequently accrue.
Where a reference is had, a payment to the referee
is not a payment into court. Neither is a mere off-
er of the amount to the plaintiff by the defendant's
counsel during the progress of the suit a good pay-
ment into court and it is not pleadable in defense.
Becker v. Boon, 61 N. Y. 317.
Cullen v. Green, 5 Harr.(Del.) 17.
As to courts of equity, it is not usually nec-
cessary that the money be brought into court unless
the court makes an order for it to be brought before
it. During very long trials, the court may require
payment into court so that the money may be invested
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for the benefit of the parties or may require the
defendant to pay interest on it if he retains it.
Whelan v. Reilly, 61 Mo. 565.
Chapter VI.
A tender is waived where the other party is
ready and willing to produce the money or thing to
be tendered but meets with a refusal or evasion of
the tender of some other act of the creditor dispen-
sing with its actual production. A tender may Ie
waived by the creditor either expeissly or impliedly,
as where he states that. nothing is due him and that
he will accept nothing or says simply that he will
not receive the money or chattels.
Hazard v. Loring, 10 Cush. 267.
Any defect in a tender is waived by the cred-
itor where he refuses to receive it on some other
ground than that which he afterwards sets up as a
defect. Thus a tender in money not legal tender is
good where the creditor objects to the amount and
not to the quality of the tender. So a tender is
good in all eases where an objection was made not
about the defect in the tender but on some other
point; as where the money was not produced and the
creditor objected to the amount. A party is pre-
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sumed to waive the objection that a tender is not in
time if he does not raise that objection when the
tender is made. But it is held that an objection
as to the amount may be brought op on the trial even
though not made at the time the tender was made.
There can be no waiver without knowledge of the de-
fect waived and an opportunity to make an objection.
Whelan v. Reilly, 61 Mo.561.
Richardson v. Jackson, 8 M.& W.298.
Adams v. Helm, 55 Mo.468.
Chicago v. S.W.R.R., 38 Iowa 377.
Connell v. Mulligan, 21 Miss.388.
Waldron v. Murphy, 40 Mich.668.
An absolute refusal to receive the money due
dispenses with the necessity of an actual tender for
reprobata pecunia liberat solventem, it is, in fact,
a waiver; while a bare refusal to receive the sum
tendered coupled with a demand of a larger amount does
not dispense with an actual tender. A refusal must
be certain and absolute in its terms. A condition-
al refusal, "till I see my attorney," is not a refus-
al in law. Where a purchaser of stock makes a dem-
and for the sasie and is ready to pay the price but
the seller refuses to comply on the ground of his
3'
inability to deliver it, no f'urther tender of' the
purchase price is necessary for payment and delivery
are concurrent acts.
Hoyt v. Sprague, 61 Barb. 497, 506.
King v. Finch, 60 Ind. 420.
Currie v. White, 45 N. Y. 822.
Chapter VII.
A plea of tender admits th, cause of action
to the amount tendered even though i , exceeds the sum
claimed in the complaint, and if made after the com-
mencement of the suit it will not excuse the payment
of costs unless a tender of costs be also averred.
It is an admission that he owes the amount tendered
and the creditor is entilled to judgment for it with-
out further proof. A tender for the purpose of af-
fecting a compromise which is not accepted is not an
admission that so much is due for it is made with a
view of arranging the controversy without litigation.
The principle is well established that concessions
made for the purpose of securing the settlement of a
controversy can not operate to the prejudice of the
party making them.
Eaton v. Wells, 82 N. Y. 576.
Currier v. Jordan, I17 Mass. 260.
Talmage v. Third Nat. Bank, 91 N. Y. 531.
A tender does not pay the debt, where what is
due is a sum of money; but it does save the tenderer
I?/ )
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from the payment of subsequent interest and costs.
Where the money is paid into court upon the trial;
if the plaintiff recovers more than the amount tend-
ered he is entitled to judgment for the full amount
claimed less the amount tendered. The plaintiff also
recovers the costs of the action. But if the plain-
tiff does not recover an amount equal to the sum tend-
ered, the defendant is entitled to costs. In any
case, upon a tender being paid into court it belongs
absolutely to the plaintiff whatever may be the amount
of his recovery and he is entitled to it upon a mo-
tion to that effect.
Archer v. Cole, 22 How. Pr. 411.
The general rule in respect to liens and oth-
er securities is that a tender of the debt releases
all securities and liens. A tender of the sum
secured by a pledge gives the pledgor the right to
retake the article pledged. As to mortgages a sim-
ilar rule prevails in some of the states. If a
tender of payment by parties having a right to re-
deem, be made when the debt falls due, it works a
complete discharge of the mortgage, divests the mort-
gagee of all his rights under the mortgage and remits
to the mortgagor all his rights at common law as ful-
ly as if there had been no mortgage, and the tender
need not be kept good because it does not operate to
discharge the debt but only defeats a particular
remedy.
Cass v.Higenbotam, 100 N. Y.
Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343.
Where the payment or tender has been made
after the condition has been broken, the same diff-
erence of opinion is encountered as in the other
branches of the law of mortgages, where the common
law and lien theories conflict. At common law ,
since the default made the estate absolute in the
mortgagee, and left 'he mortgagor only the equity of
redemption, the mere payment or tender of payment
will not revest the legal title in the mortgagor.
In those states where the mortgage is regarded as a
lien, even after condition broken, a tender of pay-
ment as well as payment Will operate as a discharge
or extinguishment of the mortgage when made at any
time before foreclosure.
In New York state where the lien theory pre-
vails, the rule is laid down in Trim v. Marsh,54 N.Y.
599,605; "It has always been the law of this state
that payment or tender of payment at any time
after the debt becomes due and before foreclosure,
destroyed the lien of the mortgage and restored the
mortgagor to his full title." The above doctrine
allowing tender to have the same effect after the
law day as on that day was first asserted in Jackson
v: Crafts, 18 Johns. II0, and it seems to have been
decided on a misapprehension of a passage in Litt.
Sec.335,338, and has been over-ruled and denied sev-
eral times in this state until it ',as settled by the
great case of Kortright v. Cady, which re-affirmed
the rule laid down in Jackson v. Crafts. It is now
the settled law of this state that a tender of money
due on a mortgage at any time before foreclosure, dis-
charges the lien of the mortgage without payment,
though made after the law day. This rule, so far
as I have observed, has only been followed by one
other state in the Union, to wit; Michigan.
Jackson v. Crafts, 18 Johns. 110.
Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343.
Renard v. Clink, 91 Mich. I.
As to mortgages on personal property, the
general rule in all the states but Minnesota and Mich-
igan seems to be that such mortgages are not liens
but sales and pass the title to the chattel. It is
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based upon the idea that the lien theory is inapplic-
able to mortgages of personal property because of
the difference in structure and effect between such
securities and qortgages upon real estate; the latter
being a lien only and conveying no legal title to
the land; while the former transferrs the title at.
once subject to a defeasance by the performance of
the condition annexed,- the payment of the debt.
Noyes v. Wycoff, 30 Hun 466,
affirmed, 114 N. Y. 204.
In Michigan and Minnesota where the lien the-
ory prevails in respect to chattel mortgages; a tend-
er of the debt secured by such a mortgage extinguishes
and discharges the lien. Nor is it necessary to
keep the tender good by bringing it into court in
case an action is thereafter brought by the mortgagee
to obtain possession of the chattels. In such a
case , however, the proof must be clear that the tenct-
er was fairly made and deliberately and intentionally
refused by the mortgagee, that sufficient opportunity
was afforded for the latter to ascertain the amount
due; and that a sum sufficient to cover the whole
amount due was absolutely and unconditionally tend-
ered. IVAoore v. Norrman, 45 N. W. 857, ( Minn. 1890)
Chapter VIII.
(Summary)
We have now passed over the general requisites
of a valid tender and have found that a tender can
be made only where the demand is liquidated and cert-
ain. We have seen the proper amount in legal tender
currency must be tendered and that it must be made
at the right time and place and between the proper
parties. We have seen that, it must be made in a
manner that is open, fair,and reasonable, and that,
good faith must be observed. Also that a tender
should be kept good and if an action is brought on
the debt, then the money should be brought into court.
We have seen that a tender should, in general, be
made without any conditions attached to it.
As to 'he efiects of a tender, it is to be
observed that it does not pay the debt but that it
releases a security or lien. It stops interest and
prevents costs from subsequently accruing. We have
also seen that any defect in a tender may be waived;
and that the courts do not favor tenders and construe
them very strictly. For this reason the law must
be strictly followed in all cases in which a tender
(3)
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is sought to be made, and the benefit arising there-
from will not be lost, provided the foregoing con-
siderations are kept clearly in mind.

